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Smith: Banks and Banking--Insolvency--Preference of County Funds Where M

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
B
s AND BANKING - INSOLVENCY - PREFERENCE OF
COUNTY FuNDs W ERE MERGa
CAUSES DEPOSITS TO EXCEED
LEGAL MAximum. In West Virginia the legal maximum of

county deposits permitted in one bank is $100,000. Two banks,
each having county deposits within the maximum, merged, lea'Ving the surviving bank with county deposits of $160,000. This
bank failed and on suit by the county the circuit court held that
since the county funds in the surviving bank exceeded $100,000
at the time of the appointment of a receiver, they were there in
violation of law and constituted a trust fund belonging to the
county,-just as though the entire amount had been originally de-

posited in the existing bank. A preference for the excess was
granted and the decision affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals. Monongalia County Court v. Bank of the Monongahela
Valley.'
State governments are usually allowed a preference over individual creditors where the two are otherwise equal because the
state succeeded to the prerogative possessed by the king at common law. Political subdivisions of the state such as counties and
municipal corporations do not have this priority. They may obtain a preference only (1) by special statute or (2) where the
money is unlawfully deposited, on the theory of a constructive
trust.,a
One line of cases holds that where a deposit of public funds
is made under such. circumstances as to constitute a trust in the
hands of the bank, it is still essential, to establish a preference on
the trust theory, to show that the general assets of the bank have
been augnented by such deposit and, in addition, to trace the
money deposited by it into the general residue now in the hands
1164
S. E. 659 (W. Va., 1932).
2
Page County v. Rose, 130 Ia. 296, 106 N. W. 744, 5 L. R. A. (n. s.) 886

(1906).
8

San Diego County v. Cal. Nat'] Bank, 52 Fed. 59 (S. D. Calif. 1892);
Knighton v. Curry, 62 Ala. 404 (1878); Singleton v. United States Fidelity
& G. Co., 194 Ala. 506, 70 So. 169 (1915); Richeson v. Crawford, 94 Ill.
165 (1879); Bunton v. King, So Ia. 506, 45 N. W. 1050 (1890); Page
County v. -Rose, supra n. 2; Brown v. Sheldon State Bank, 139 Ia. 83, 117
N. W. "289 (1908); Myers v. Board of Education, 51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac. 658,
37 Am. St. Rep. 263 (1893); Fidelity & D. Co. v. Wilkinson County, 109
Miss. 879, 69 So. 865 (1915); State v. Midland State Bank, 52 Neb. 1, 71
N. W. 1011, 66 Am. St. Rep. 484 (1897); Watts v. Cleveland County, 21

Oka. 231, 95 Pae. 771, 16 L. R. A. (n. s.)918 (1908); Boltz's Estate, 133
Pa. 77, 19 AtL 303 (1890).
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of the receiver.' It has been held that no constructive trust can
be raised on such deposits unless they can be traced,' and the burden of tracing is on the party seeking the preference.8
Another line of cases, however, supports the rule.that where
public funds are illegally deposited a constructive trust is established and such funds constitute a preferred claim without any
proof of augmentation or tracing of the res." Should this rule be
applied both where the excess is created by one original deposit
and where a merger of several banks caused it, as in the principal case? It is submitted that this is a rational extension of the
rule since the reason for giving the preference exists equally in
both situations - the illegality of the deposit of public funds.8
But is the rule itself sound?
The idea underlying the requirement that the res be traced is
'The courts are confused as to just what constitutes tracing, however,
as the following cases show. Crawford County v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49, 84
C. C. A. 553, 15 L. R. A. (n. s.)1100 (1907); Primeau v. Granfield, 184
Fed. 480 (1911); Fiman v. South Dakota, 29 Fed. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. 8th,
1928); First National Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 48 Fed. (2d)
585 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Schumacher v. Harriett, 52 Fed. (2d) 817 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1932) (no preference where funds were used to decrease existing
liabilities of bank since no augmentation); Hill v. Miles, 83 Ark. 486, 104
S. W. 198 (1907); Myers v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 134 So. 600
(Fla., 1931) ; State v. Bruce, 17 Idaho 1, 102 Pac. 831 (1909) ; Bellevue State
Bank v. Coffin, 22 Idaho 210, 125 Pac. 816 (1912); Officer v. Officer, 120
Ia. 389, 90 N. W. 826 (1902); Murray v. North Liberty Say. Bank, 196
Ia. 729, 195 N. W. 354 (1923); Hudspeth v. Union Trust & Say. Bank, 197
Ia. 913, 193 N. W. 279 (1923) (no preference in absence of showing that
the fund had not been dissipated and had come into receiver's hands as a
traceable account or a distince augmentation of the whole); Andrew v.
Eddyville Say. Bank, 204 Ia. 431, 215 N. W. 635 (1927) ("The absence of
pleading and proof of the traceability of the fund to the receiver is fatal
to the claimant's case even though a trust was properly pleaded and established").
rDaughtry v. International Bank, 18 N. M. 119, 119 Pac. 220 (1913);
Shute v. Hinman, 34 Ore. 578, 56 Pac. 412, 58 Pac. 882, 47 L. R. A. 265
(1899).
GSchuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U. S. 707, 34 S. Ct. (1914); Com'rs. v.
Strawn, 157 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); Waddell v. Waddell, 36 Utah 435,
104 Pac. 743 (1909); Chase and Baker Co. v. Olmsted, 93 Wash. 306, 160
Pac. 952 (1916); BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 521.
7San Diego County v. California Nat'l Bank, supra n. 3 (county funds);
Farmers' Savings Bank of Hamburg v. City of Hamburg, 204 Ia. 1083,
216 N. W. 748 (1927) (city funds). See also annotations in (1927) 51 A.
L. R. 1336 and (1930) 65 A. L. R. 690.
8The logical difficulty with this extension is that on merging, the excess
of the total account with the surviving bank over the legal amount is simply
a general indebtedness and the bank has no funds of the county. The effect
of the statute is the creation of a duty to pay out the excess above the
legal maximum. How is it that such a duty can be said to give rise to a
proprietary interest in the liquid assets of the bank where none existed
before?

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss2/11

2

Smith: Banks and Banking--Insolvency--Preference of County Funds Where M
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
that the claimant has an equity in a specific thing which is in the
hands of someone else - either his actual property or its proceeds.
Hence, tracing the property he claims into the property from
which such preference is sought is quite naturally a prerequisite
to the granting of a preferred claim. "Following the res" does
not mean that the specific dollars deposited must be traced, but
only that the deposited sum must be substantially identified as part
of that now in the hands of the receiver.' A showing that the
funds coming into the possession of the receiver as general assets of the defunct institution were never, after the original deposit, less than the amount of the trust funds is usually held a
sufficient augmentation and tracing? Practical difficulties explain the looseness of the rule as applied in bank cases. Absolute
tracing there may be impossible since, for example, the funds deposited may be paid out at once without having been physically
mingled with other funds of the bank and yet there would be no
record of the fact.
It does not appear from the opinion in the principal case
whether the general assets of the bank fell below the amount
claimed as a trust fund, between the time of depositing and the
insolvency of the bank, but the decision is broad enough to imply
that a preference would be allowed if tracing were impossible.
Such a rule is just another discrimination against the much
Since the trust notion is only a
neglected general depositor.
formula with which to dress a preference, in this instance would
it not be better to declare the preference openly as a protection for
public funds? To clothe the preference in trust language is to
give it the effect of a specific lien which takes priority over a
This
general preference' not based on a proprietary theory.
GLathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17, 89 Am. Dec. 141 (1866); Davenport
Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Ia. 722, 45 N. W. 1049 (1890); Peak v. Ellicott, 30
Kan. 156, 1 Pac. 499 (1883); Neely v. Rood, 54 Mich. 134, 19 IT. W. 920

(1884); Farmers' Nat'l Bank v. King, 57 Pa. St. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215
(1868); McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28 N.TW. 173, 214 (1886).
10Leach v. Farmers' Say. Bank, 205 Ia. 114, 217 N. W. 437 (1928) (showing by use of bank records that fund coming into hands of receiver was
never, between time of deposit and insolvency of the bank, less than amount
of trust funds, held a sufficient tracing and augmentation); Chapman v.
First Nat'l Bank, supra n. 4; In re State Bank of Portland, 110 Ore. 61,
222 Pac. 740 (1924); Hitt Fireworks Co. v. Scandinavian American Bank of
Tacoma, 121 Wash. 261, 209 Pac. 680 (1922).
'While immaterial to general depositors since their rights are
considered in either event, to designate this preference as a
arbitrarily prejudices the rights of those having bona fide trust
also injures the prospects of those holding genuine -ordinary
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result should and can be obviated by deliberately allowing a simple preference.
-KmG LEY R. SmuTH.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw -

TAX-EXEMPTION

op REALTY

PUR-

With money received
from the United States Government under provisions of the War
Insurance Act of 1924,' the petitioners, husband and wife, purchased a home located in Atlanta, Georgia.
The city assessed
taxes against this property, and an action was brought to restrain
tax sale. Petitioners sought exemption under § 22' of the War
Insurance Act, providing: "The compensation, insurance, and
maintenance and support allowances payable under Parts II, III,
and IV, respectively, shall not be assignable, shall not be subject
to the claims of creditors of any persons to whom an award is
made ....
and shall be exempt from all taxation." The Georgia
court held that realty, purchased with money so received, was
tax-exempt. City of Atlanta v. Stokes.'
The petitioners' claim for exemption did not arise from any
implication of dual sovereignty or federal supremacy, as the court
declared, but was based on an express statutory provision, so
that only a question of statutory construction was before the
court.
It is a well-established rule that provisions exempting
property from taxation must be construed strictissini juris, and
that no exemptions can be made by implication.' Clearly, the
CHASED WITH WAR INSURANCE PAYMENTS. -

since trust claims must first be paid in full before satisfaction of general
charges.
'The Insurance Act is a part of the Veterans' Relief Act, 38 U. S. C.
A. §§ 421-576 (1926).
238 U. S. C. A. § 454 (1926).
8165 S. E. 270 (Ga., 1932). This decision follows Rucker v. Merck, 172
Ga. 793, 159 S. E. 501 (1931). These two decisions stand alone. Contra:
State v. Wright, 140 So. 584 (Ala., 1932); State v. Board of Com'rs., 132
Kan. 253, 294 Pac. 915 (1931), Cert. denied, 283 U. S. 855, 51 S. Ct. 648
(1931); Martin v. Guilford County, 201 N. C. 63, 158 S. E. 847 (1931);
Lambert v. Guilford County, 201 N. C. 67, 158 S. E. 849 (1931). For a
criticism of Rucker v. Merck, supra, see (1931) 10 N. C. L. REV. 103; (1932)
6 CIn. L. REV. 248. But see (1932) 17 CoaN. L. Q. 259.
'Memphis Ry. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609, 5 S. Ct. 299 (1884);
Chicago Ry. Co. v. Mo., 120 U. S. 569, 7 S. Ct. 693 (1886); Winona
Land Co. v. Minn., 159 U. S. 526, 16 S. Ct. 83 (1895); Bank v. Tenn., 161
U. S. 134, 16 S. Ct. 456 (1885); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tenn., 161 U. S. 174,
16 S. Ct. 471 (1895); Yazoo Ry. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 1, 21 S. Ct. 240
(1900); Morris Canal Co. v. Baird, 239 U. S. 126, 36 S. Ct. 28 (1915);
Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480, 52 S. Ct. 424 (1931).
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